Diferencia entre revisiones de «Oliver Hart»
Contenido eliminado Contenido añadido
ortografía; mantenimiento |
→Artículos seleccionados: ; ortografía |
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Línea 22:
* «On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete.» ''Journal of Economic Theory'', diciembre 1975, 418-443
* «Takeover Bids, the Free-rider problem, and the Theory of the Corporation.» (Con Sanford J. Grossman.) ''Bell Journal of Economics'', primavera 1980, 42-64
* «An Analysis of the [[Problema del agente-principal|Principal–Agent Problem]].» (
* «The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme.» ''Bell Journal of Economics'', 14 (otoño 1983) 366-82.
* «The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.» (Con Sanford J. Grossman), ''Journal of Political Economy'', agosto 1986, 691-719.
Línea 28:
* «Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.» (Con John Hardman Moore.) ''Econometrica'' 56(4) (julio 1988).
* «Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.» (Con John Hardman Moore), ''Journal of Political Economy'' 98(6) (1990).
* «A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital.» (Con John Hardman Moore.) ''[[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]'',
* «The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons.» (Con [[Andrei Shleifer]] y Robert W. Vishny.) ''Quarterly Journal of Economics'' 112(4) (1997) 1126-61.
* «Contracts as Reference Points.» (Con John Hardman Moore.) ''Quarterly Journal of Economics'', febrero 2008, 1-48.
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